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mote a fuller realization of American ideals." 9 But the clause has
never been successfully applied to representation cases, 120 and its
relevance to the West Virginia constitutional and statutory provisions under question present even greater difficulties. Initially,
"The State" would have to be interpreted as the "body of citizens;"
otherwise the guarantee would be applied on behalf of the state as
against the state. In addition, a very broad intrepretation of the
phrase "Republican form of Government" would be required
to
2
attach relevance to voting on an issue .'

Daniel F. Hedges

Constitutional Law-Lance v. Board of Education-The

Dissenting Opinion
I The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Haymond's vigorous dissent to the majority's decision
was two-fold: it denied the authority of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals to declare a provision of the West Virginia constitution unconstitutional, and it denied that the circumstances in
Lance were such as to warrant an extension of the "one person, one
vote" principle.
In support of its first contention, the minority argued initially
that the court was bound by oath to support the West Virginia constitution; secondly that only the sovereign people of West Virginia
could ratify, amend and repeal their state constitution; and thirdly that the court's assertion of authority was without precedent.
The dissent's first argument dismissed the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution.' Article IV, section five of the
West Virginia constitution sets forth the oath by which all public
... Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitution: Guarantee of a
Republican Government, 50 CALiF. L. REV. 245 (1962); Bonfield, The Guaranty
Clause of Article IV, Section 4; A Study of Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN.
L. REv. 513 (1962).
'See e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Irish v. Democratic Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Gir. 1968):
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. 282 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. N.Y. 1968).
"ZtThis guaranty clause argument was presented by the appellees. Brief for
Appellees at 31, Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E.F d 783 (W. Va. 1969).
'US. CONsr. art. VI.
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officeholders in West Virginia swear to uphold the Constitution of
the United States and the State of West Virginia. 2 Given the nature
of the federal system and the logical implications of the supremacy
clause, it is difficult to deny that a state judge's higher allegiance
is to the United States Constitution.3
Perhaps the simplest argument in support of the authority of
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to determine the issue
can be made syllogistically. The United States Constitution is the
supreme law of the land.4 All public officeholders in West Virginia
must swear to uphold the West Virginia constitution and the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, in the exercise of its
judicial functions, it is the duty of the West Virginia court to uphold
the Federal Constitution, "anything in the constitution or laws of
any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
The second assertion of the dissent was that only the sovereign
people of West Virginia could ratify, amend or repeal the West
Virginia constitution. Certainly the constitution itself establishes
this point.? However, to rely on this basis is to equate the power to
ratify, amend and repeal with a power to judicially review. The
logical conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that the

2

Every person elected or appointed to any office, before proceeding to exercise the authority, or discharge the duties thereof, shall make oath or
affirmation that he will support the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of this State, and that he will faithfully discharge the duties of his said office to the best of his skill and judgment; and no other oath, declaration, or test shall be required as a
qualification, unless herein otherwise provided. W. VA. CONST. art.
IV,§ 5.
'The dissenting opinion quoted Chief Justice Marshall for the proposition
that it would be immoral to impose upon a judge an oath of allegiance to the
United States Constitution and then to permit him to violate what he had sworn
to support. This principle, Judge Haymond contends, applies as well to the
oath of a state judge to support his state constitution. Judge Haymond failed to
continue, as did Chief Justice Marshall, that the "particular phraseology" of the
United States Constitution (i.e. the supremacy clause) confirms the principle
that any law repugnant to the Constitution is void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803).
'U. S. CONSr. art. VI; W. VA. CoNsr. art. I § 1.
'W. VA. CONSr. art. IV, § 5.
'U.S. CoNSr. art. VI.
T
A majority of the members of the Legislature or a majority of those voting
in an authorized referendum must vote affirmatively in order to authorize the
calling of a convention to alter the West Virginia constitution. W. VA. CoNsr.
art. XIV, § 1. A two-thirds affirmative vote by the members of each house of
the Legislature, or an affirmative vote by a majority of those voting in a referendum is sufficient to amend the West Virginia constitution. W. VA. CoNsr.
art. XIV, § 2.
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sovereign people of West Virginia have the power to ratify constitutional provisions which violate the United States Constitution, and
by implication, to call on the three branches of state government,
bound by the state constitution, to uphold the popular decision.
The minority's third argument pointed to the absence of
precedent in support of the majority's assertion of authority. In
support of this contention, the minority opinion cited three West
Virginia cases, State ex rel. Smith v. Gore,8 Re: The Assessment of
Shares of Stock of the Kanawha Valley Bank 9 and Harbert v. The
County Court of HarrisonCounty10 for the proposition that only the
sovereign people of West Virginia can alter the West Virginia constitution. However, in none of these cases was there an allegation of a
violation of a federally protected right.
In Smith, the sole issue decided was that it was necessary under
the constitution and statutes of West Virginia to provide for equal
representation on the election of delegates to a state constitutional
convention. In the Kanawha Valley Bank case, the only question
determined was that the Kanawha Valley Bank, as a taxpaying corporation, had suffered a state constitutional discrimination by
having its shares assessed for the payment of ad valorem taxes upon
the basis of one hundred per cent of its actual value.11 The constitutional question raised in Harbert was also a state issue: the
court ruled that a 1945 act of the Legislature' 2 authorizing a salary
increase for the then-presiding judge of the Harrison County Criminal Court was violative of article VI, section 38 of the West Virginia
constitution, which prohibits the alteration of the salary of a
public officer during his term of office.

8150 W. VA. 71, 143 S.E. 2d 791 (1965).
9144 W. VA. 346, 109 S.E. 2d 649 (1959).
10129 W. VA. 54, 39 S.E. 2d 177 (1946).
'The West Virginia constitution art. X, § 1 prohibits taxing any one
species of property higher than any other species of equal value. The money and
shares involved were assessed at one hundred percent, while all other property in the taxing unit (Kanawha County), was systematically assessed at a lower
percent of value. The case was decided on the basis of a state constitutional
reqiurement. The majority noted that no fourteenth amendment right was involved, because there was no tax discrimination within the class. 144 W. Va. 346,
386, 109 S.E. 2d 649, 671 (1959).
'Ch. 163, Acts of the W. VA. Leg., Reg. Sess. 1968.
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The dissent in Lance also cited several cases in which the
validity of article X of the West Virginia constitution was affirmed.13
Again, no federal questions were raised in any of these cases.
There is a surprising dearth of United States Supreme Court
opinion on the jurisdictional question which Judge Haymond raises:
state supreme court decisions which have been granted certiorari
have been decided on the merits of the controversy and not on the
question of jurisdiction.
Reitman v. Mulkey 4 also involved a right claimed under the
fourteenth amendment. The case arose from "Proposition 14" which
the California electorate embodied in the California constitution
in a 1964 referendum. "Proposition 14" provided in part that the
state would neither deny nor limit the right of any person to refuse
to sell, lease or rent any of his real property to any person of his
choosing.'" The California Supreme Court concluded that "Proposition 14" not only repealed existing California law forbidding private racial discrimination, but also established the right to discriminate privately as basic state policy and was, therefore, invalid
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
a five to four decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
California court's decision.
Justice White, in delivering the opinion of the court, stated
that the California court had properly examined the constitutionality of article I, section 26 "in terms of its 'immediate objective', its
'ultimate effect' and 'its historical context and the conditions existing prior to enactment'."'16 The Court gave careful consideration to
the California court's views, "because they concern the purpose,
scope and operative effect of a provision of the California Constitution."'1 "[T]he California court, armed as it was with the
knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage
and potential impact of § 26 and familar with the milieu in which
that provision would operate," determined that the State of California had involved itself in "private racial discrimination to an un-

'Berry v. Fox, 114 W. Va. 513, 172 SaE. 896 (1934); Bee v. City of Huntington, 114 W. Va. 40, 171 S.E. 539, (1933); Finlayson. v. City of Shinnston, 113
W. VA. 434, 168 S.E. 479 (1933); Herold v. Townsend, 113 W. VA. 319, 169 S.E.

74 (1933).

"387 U.S. 369 (1967).
"CAL. CoNsr. art. 1, §

See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
26, see 387 U.S. 369, 371 (1967).

'"Id. at 373.
"'Id.at 374.
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constitutional degree," and the United States Supreme Court accepted that determination. s
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Harlan, denied the
merits of the controversy, asserting that the "encouragement" of
private discrimination by state enactment is a matter left open by
the United States Constitution, but it did not question the authority
of the state court to challenge the constitutionality of its state constitution. 19
In a 1965 case, ° the Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Supreme Court of Texas and declared unconstitutional a provision of the Texas constitution permitting a serviceman to vote only
in the county where he resided at the time of his entry into the
service. The Court did not, however, comment on the authority of
the Texas court to rule on the federal constitutional question.
The absence of such comment perhaps inferentially supports
the Lance majority's assertion of authority and the Supreme Court
has, by dicta, commented with approval on the distribution of federal questions between state and federal tribunals. In Robb v. Connolly,21 the Court placed upon both judicial systems the obligation of enforcing rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, irrespective of any provision in the laws or constitution of a
particular state.
State supreme court cases on federal constitutional questions
are more numerous. Closely related to Lance are The Homestead
Casesf three cases which arose from article XI, section 1 of the
Virginia constitution and chapter 157 of the Act of June 27, 1870
(passed in pursuance of the constitutional provision). The Virginia
Court of Appeals ruled that the constitutional provision and statute,
which granted a two thousand dollar exemption of the property of
every debtor, to be in violation of article VIII, section 10 of the
United States Constitution, which prohibits a state from passing a
law impairing the obligation of contract. The Virginia court upheld
the power of a state supreme court to declare unconstitutional a
state constitutional provision.

'81d. at 378.
"Id. at 396.
'Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
"III U.S. 624, 637 (1884).
-63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 266 (1872).
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The supreme courts of Colorado, Oregon and California have
also upheld their authority to adjudicate federal constitutional
questions. The Colorado court has declared the determination of
federal constitutional questions to be a duty which the people of
Colorado cannot abbrogate by constitutional provision or otherwise. The Oregon court has ruled that the prohibition against
the impairment of the obligation of contract applies to an amend24
ment to a state constitution as well as to the passage of a state law.
The California court, recognizing the supremacy clause, concluded
that a state constitutional provision must necessarily yield to the
"supreme law of the land". 25
The determination of the fourteenth amendment issued by
the West Virginia court does not preclude federal review. Such
power of review was initially established by Marbury v. Madison,
which confirmed the federal courts' authority to determine the
27
constitutionality of federal laws, and Martin v. Hunters Lessee,
which extended federal appellate review to cases pending in state
courts. The appellate rule laid down in Murdock v. City of Memphis9 authorizes the Supreme Court to determine if a state court
erroneously decided the federal question. If the federal question
either controls the entire case or the state court's decision on state
issues is not sufficient to sustain its judgment, the Supreme Court
is empowered to reverse the judgment and render the correct one
or remand the case to the state for further proceedings.
Fay v.Noia established the principle that federal courts are
not without power to grant habeas corpus relief to an applicant after
the state court has decided the federal question on the merits
against the applicant. Nor are federal courts without power to
grant habeas corpus relief to an applicant whose federal claims
would not be heard on direct review because of a procedural default
furnishing an adequate and independent ground of state decision"o
A litigant's procedural defaults in a state proceeding will not pre-

'People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 P. 146 (1921).
'Haberlach v. Tillamook County Bank, 134 Ore. 279, 293 P. 927 (1930).
'Allen v. Railway Comm., 179 Cal. 68, 175 P. 466 (1918).
'Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
'114 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 575 (1816).
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
29372 U.S. 391 (1963).

"'Id. at 434.
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vent vindication of his federal rights unless the state's compliance
with its procedural rule serves a legitimate state interest.3'
The dissenting opinion in Lance denied that the one person,
one vote principle could be applied to the circumstances there because the election involved was a revenue bond election and not
an election of a governmental representative and because there was
no question of apportionment on a population basis: each person
voting in the Roane County election cast one vote, which was
counted as one vote. According to the dissent the issue of the case
was simple: the plaintiffs, as affirmative voters, did not poll enough
votes to win the election.
A discussion of the merits of the controversy and the appli.
cation of the one person, one vote principle is found in a comment in this volume on the majority opinion. While it is presumptuous to speculate on Judge Haymond's philosophical inclinations
and the motivation behind his attack on the majority's decision,
one senses that underlying his substantive argument is a concept of
judicial power which denies the justiciabity of such basically political questions: such issues are better left to the determination of
the electorate, which in 1966, by a vote of 212,883 to 206,542, defeated an amendment which would have removed the sixty percent
requirement. This line of thinking is similar to that of Justice Har3
lan, who wrote in his dissenting opinion in Wesberry v. Sanders:1
This Court, no less than all other branches of the
Government is bound by the Constitution. The Constitution does not confer on the Court the blanket authority to
step into every situation where the political branch may be
thought to have fallen short. The stability of this institution ultimately depends not only upon its being alert to
keep the other branches of government within constitutional bounds but equally upon recognition of the limitations
on the Court's own functions in the constitutional system.
II The Separability Issue
The majority of the court found only that the sixty percent
requirements of article X, section 1 and 8 of the West Virginia con-

'Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
252 Wsr VIRGINI BLUEBOOK 350 (1968).
"376 U.S. 1, 48 (1963).
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stitution and chapter 11, article 8, section 16 and chapter 13, article
1, sections 4 and 14 of the West Virginia Code violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and are therefore
unconstitutional and unenforceable. In a motion to intervene as
additional parties defendant, the intervenors contended that the
sixty percent requirements are inseparable from the remainder of
the provision: thus the entire bond issue and excess levy procedure
would be invalid. There is ample precedent in West Virginia in
support of the separability of a statute.34 There is no precedent on
the separability of a constitutional provision, since up to this time
no constitutional provision has been declared invalid.
The general test is whether the constitutional part of the
statute can stand alone, independent of the unconstitutional part,
capable of being enforced in accordance with the legislative intent.35 If the general purpose of the statute is not dependent upon
the unconstitutional provision, the statute is separable.38 To invalidate the entire clause, substantially all of the act would have to be
unconstitutional. 37 The United States Supreme Court has stated

'Nuckols v. Athey, 149 W. Va. 40, 198 S.E. 2d 344 (1964) (Chapter 17A,
article 3, § 4 of the Code of 1931, as amended by the Legislature in 1959, imposing a greater motor vehicle tax on vehicles purchased outside West Virginia
than on those purchased inside discriminated against interstate commerce and
violated art. I, § 5 of the United States Constitution) ; Stae ex rel. County Court
v. Battle, 147 W. Va. 841, 131 9,E. 2d 730 (1963). (Items in the budgets of the
County Courts of Cabell and Wyoming Counties granting additional compensation to respective circuit judges in excess of the amount prescribed by act of
the Legislature held unconstitutional); Meisel v. Tri-State Airport Authority,
135 W. Va. 528, 64 S.F. 2d 32 (1951) (Act of the Legislature creating the TriState Airport Authority and authorizing it to issue revenue bonds); Lingamfelter
v. Brown, 132 W. Va. 566, 52 S.F. 2d 687 (1949) (Act of the Legislature imposing tax on commercial apples levied for private purposes held unconstitutional) ;
Harbert v. County Court, 129 W. Va. 54, 39 S.E. ?d 177 (1946) (Act of the
Legislature increasing salary of the judge of the criminal court of Harrison
county during present term of office held in violation of W. VA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 38); County Court v. Painter, 123 W. Va. 415, 15 S.E.2d 396 (1941) (Act of
the Legislature permitting circuit clerk to appeal to circuit court for a salary
increase violated W. VA. CONsT. art. V); Prichard v. DeVan, 114 W. Va. 509, 172
S.E. 711 (1934) (Act of the Legislature placing paid municipal fire departments under civil service held unconstitutional); Fairmont Wall Plaster Co. v.
Nuzum, 85 W. Va. 667, 102 S. E. 494 (1920) (Municipal charter repealed before paving in question was done).
nSee Meisel v. Tri-State Airport Authority, 135 W. Va. 528, 64 S.E.2d 32
(1951); Lingamfelter v. Brown, 132 W. Va. 566, 52 S.E. 2d 687 (1949); Harbert
v. County Court, 129 W. Va. 54, 39 S.E. 2d 177 (1946); Pritchard v. DeVan, 114
W. Va. 509, 173 S.E. 711 (1934).
'See County Court v. Painter, 123 W. Va. 415, 15 S.E. 2d 396 (1941).
"'Fairmont Wall Plaster Co. v. Nuzum, 85 W. Va. 667, 102 S.E. 494 (1920).
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that separability applies as well to separable provisions of a single
38
section of a statute.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has liberally interpreted separability cases. In State v. Miller39 the court separated
an obscenity statute and ruled that it was unconstitutional only insofar as the statute undertook to establish an improper standard.
The court has also established the principle that a statute may be
unconstitutional in its application to part of the subject matter and
valid as to the remainder, and it may be constitutional in operation with respect to one set of facts and not to another. 40
From a purely pragmatic standpoint, the court has no alternative but to rule the sixty percent requirement separable from
the rest of the provisions. To invalidate the entire provision would
be to invalidate the entire bond issuance procedure. The consequences, in terms of existing bonds and levies and the general
financial integrity of the State of West Virginia, would be to say
the least, disastrous.
III Implications
The implications of the Lance decision are obviously far-reaching. The dissenting opinion suggests that all other constitutional
provisions requiring a two-thirds or a three-fourths vote for approval are therefore logically invalid. However, six of the seven
examples cited concern the internal rules of the Legislature and are
not questions on which the general electorate would be entitled to
vote.41 The minority also cited article X, section 7 of the West Vir'Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 at 45 (1908):
The same rule that permits separable sections of a statute to be declared
unconstitutional without rendering the entire statute void, applies to
separable provisions of a section of a statute.
10145 W. Va. 59, 112 S.E. 2d 472 (1960).
"Harbert v. County Court, 129 W. Va. 54, 39 S.. 2d 177 (1946).
'A two-thirds vote by the Senate is necessary to convict in an impeachment
proceeding. W. VA. CoNsr. art. IV, § 9; The Governor must convene the Legislature on written application by three-fifths of the members of each house.
W. VA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19. During the thirty day session, the Legislature
may, by motion adopted by two-thirds of the members of each house, include for consideration such business as it may itself propose; all regular sessions
may be extended by concurrence of two-thirds of the members of each house.
W. VA. CoNsr. art. VI, § 22; In case of urgency, a four-fifths vote of the memhers present will pass a bill without its being read on three different days. W. VA.
CONST. art. VI § 29; A two-thirds vote by each hottse will waive the ninety day
period between the passage of an act and the date of its effect. W. VA. CONSr. art.
VI, § 30; a two-thirds vote by each house will place a proposed constitutional
amendment in the journal. W. VA. CoNsr. art. XIV, § 2.
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ginia constitution, which requires a three-fifths vote by a county
electorate to increase the aggregate tax assessment.
Statutory provisions which establish three-fifths requirements
have greater implications. Sixty percent approval is required to
42
authorize the county court to issue bonds and to increase the levies.
Chapter 8 of the Code, which sets forth the municipal corporation
system, contains two sixty percent provisions which give some
indication of the impact of Lance on municipal elections. Sixty
percent approval is required to authorize a municipal corporation
to issue bonds for the improvement and reimprovement of streets,
sidewalks and sewers. 43 The governing body of any "Class III city"
or "Class IV town or village' is prohibited from disposing of the
municipal waterworks without the approval of sixty percent of the
electorate. 44 The application of the Lance principle to the innumerable municipal revenue elections would change the complexion of
West Virginia municipal government. 5 A conceivable argument is
that Lance may be extended to the fundamental election procedure
of West Virginia. A plurality is sufficient to nominate and elect:
West Virginia has no provision for run-off primary and general
elections. 48 Hypothetically, a candidate who receives only a fraction
of a percent more than one-fourth or one-fifth (depending on the
number in the race) of the total votes cast may be nominated and
subsequently elected. In reality, this is minority rule: a candidate
who is supported by substantially less than half of the electorate
may be placed in office. Viewed from another standpoint, in a three
ch. 7, art. 3, § 13 (Michie 1969).
VA. COD ch. 8, art. 18, § 16 (Michie 1969).

1W. VA. CODE

'W.

"W. VA. CODE: ch. 8, art. 19, § 2 (Michie 1969).
'It might be noted that the West Virginia constitution and Code contain
more electoral provisions requiring majority approval than approval
by two-thirds or three-fifths. The Governor's nomination and a majority vote of

the Senate is sufficient to fill a vacancy in non-elective offices. W. VA. CONsr.
art. VII § 9. A new school district will be created if a majority of the voters
voting on the question approve. W. VA. CONsr. art. Xf1, § 10. The amendment
procedure provides that an affirmative vote by a majority of the members of the
Legislature or a majority of those voting in a referendum is sufficient to call a
constitutional convention and approval by a majority of those voting in a referendum is sufficient to ratify an amendment. W. VA. CONST. art. XIV, § § 1, 2. A
majority vote is sufficient to authorize the issuance of bonds for municipal park
facilities. W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 10, 28 (Michie Supp. 1969).
voting in a local option election can prevent the application of the "Sunday
Closing Law". W.VA. CoDE ch. 61, art. 10 § 28 (Michie Supp. 1969).
'See W. VA. CONSr. art. VIII, § 3; W. VA. CoDE ch. 3, art. 5, § 4 (Michie 1966);
McCoy v. Fisher, 136 W. Va. 447, 67 S.E.2d 543 (1951); Brannon v. Perky,
127 W. Va. 103, 31 S.F_.. 2d 898 (1944).
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way race, sixty-six percent of those voting may vote against candidate
X and only thirty-four percent for him, yet he is nominated. In
effect, it can be argued this system dilutes the "negative" vote and
weights the "affirmative" vote in a manner similar to that in a
sixty percent requirement election.
Such a situation obviously occurs most frequently in a partisan
primary, where three, four and five man races are a regular occurrence. Its impact obviously extends to the general election: returning to the hypothetical three-way race, two candidates nominated
by thirty-four percent of the party members voting in the primary
run against each other, resulting in the election of a candidate
who is at best the second choice of a bare majority of the general
electorate.
The "negative" vote would be further diluted by the inclusion of additional candidates in the general election race. The West
Virginia Code authorizes the nomination of candidates by citizens
having no political party by the filing of a certificate with the
Secretary of State.47 In a multi-candidate general race the possibility
of a "minority" officeholder is more apparent. It is unlikely that
one candidate would receive a majority. The "affirmative" vote
would be weighted in direct mathematical proportion to the number in the race.48 The run-off election system, which requires a run'"T he statutory requirement is that a certificate bear signatures equal to
at least one percent of the entire vote cast in the last preceding general election
for the office in the political subdivision for which the nomination is to be
made. W. VA. CoDE ch. 3, art. 5,§ 23 (Michie 1966). W. VA. CODE ch. 3, art. 5,
§ 22 (Michie 1966) provides that any political party which polled less than ten
percent of the total vote cast only for governor at the general election immediately4 preceding may nominate a candidate by party convention.
SThe Supreme Court has however, demonstrated in Fortson v. Morris,
385 U.S. 231 (1966), its unwillingness to interfere with the method of election
of a governor. In a five to four decision, the Court upheld a Georgia constitutional provision which authorized the selection of Georgia's governor from the
two candidates receiving the most votes by a majority vote of the Georgia General Assembly, provided no candidate received a majority in the general election.
The Court had previously ruled in Toombs v. Fortson, 384 U.S. 210 (1966),
that the Georgia Legislature was malapportioned, but had specified that the
Legislature could continue functioning until May 1, 1968. The Court reasoned
that in the absence of a federal constitutional provision prescribing how a state
must select its governor, the Georgia Legislature, although concededly malapportioned, was authorized to act.
Justice Fortas, although vigorously dissenting from the Court's decision,
impliedly upheld the plurality system. "The candidate receiving more votes than
any other must receive the office unless he is disqualified on some constitutionally permissible basis, or unless, in a run-off or some type of election, the
people properly and regularly, by their votes, decide differently." Fortson v.
Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 250 (1966).
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off between the top two vote getters if no candidate polls a majority,
alleviates the problem to some extent by giving the voters an alternative choice.
These possible applications of the Lance principle occur in
West Virginia: obviously these extensions of the rule will profoundly affect the state's electoral processes. The ultimate national effect
of the Lance decision will depend on the action taken by the United
States Supreme Court in the event of review. However, even if certiorari is denied, it is reasonable to assume that the case will lead
to a flood of litigation.
Diana Everett

Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process Application
To Pre-Judgment Garnishment
Christine Sniadach was a mill worker employed at a salary of
$63.18 per week. The complainant, Family Finance Corporation of
Bay View, alleged a claim of $420 on a promissory note, and instituted an action against her in the Wisconsin courts. Taking advantage
of the Wisconsin garnishment laws,1 Family Finance proceeded to
have her wages frozen pending disposition of the suit. Mrs. Sniadach
sought to have the pre-judgment proceedings dismissed on the ground
that they deprived her of property without satisfying due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. The county court found,
however, that the pre-judgment garnishment procedure satisfied
the requirements for due process. After the decision was affirmed
by the circuit court and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Mrs.
Sniadach petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.
Held, reversed. This pre-judgment garnishment of wages without
notice and a prior hearing violated due process of law. Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
In the Sniadach decision, the Supreme Court emphasized
that in extraordinary situations certain summary proce'Under Wisconsin law, all that is necessary to garnish an alleged debtor's
wages is that the clerk of the court issue a summons at the request of the
creditor's lawyer; and it is the lawyer who, by serving the garnishee, sets in
motion the machinery whereby the wages are frozen. The Supreme Court paid
particular attention to: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.04 (1) (Supp. 1969). WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 267.07 (1) (Supp. 1969) ; and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.18 (2) (Supp. 1969).
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